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This study which consists largely of Soviet and other newspaper quotations, covers the military phase of the Soviet atomic energy program during the period 1945 - 1956.

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

SECRET**MILITARY USE OF THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY****A. Introduction**

Since the Soviet Union has reached the threshold of an atomic era, it has consistently advocated the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and has been acting as if this was the prerequisite for the peaceful use of atomic energy. But the Soviet Union is devoting its entire national energy in preparing for an atomic war, unmindful of its contradiction with what it has been advocating.

It is a plain fact that the USSR is actually conducting research on, manufacturing of, experimenting with, and the stockpiling of, the atomic weapons and hydrogen bombs and guided missiles and trajectory weapons. This is regarded as necessary because "at present there is no definite guarantee of permanent peace because the agreement concerning the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armed strength has not yet been reached and because the security of Europe has not yet been achieved." (Zhdanov) Even more plainly, it is said that the USSR has no choice but to work on such weapons "so long as America opposes the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and so long as disarmament is not carried out." (Mikoyan) Moreover, the USSR has been saying repeatedly, and it still does, that it will fight for "disarmament, prohibition of atomic and hydrogen bombs, and peaceful coexistence" because these are the decisive means to guarantee permanent peace. But such an argument could be made equally by the US.

We, therefore, want to ask the following question: What does the Soviet Union think about the atomic war? How is the preparation for

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atomic war, including experiments on atomic and hydrogen weapons, being carried out?

To answer these questions, we will not depend on estimates and data published in Western Europe but will mainly analyze data published in the USSR and add some of our own comments on them. We will omit data concerning such items as the amount of atomic and hydrogen bombs stock-piled by the Soviet Union or on data on guided missiles and aircraft.

B. Soviet Union's View on Atomic War

To judge how the Soviet Union views the atomic war, it is first necessary to clarify the official interpretation of the Soviet authorities concerning the power of atomic weapons.

As an official interpretation of the Soviet authorities on atomic weapons, the reply made by Stalin to the correspondent of the Sunday Times on 17 September 1946 is often quoted in particular years.

Stalin's statement was: "The atomic bomb is a threat to those with delicate nerves; it does not determine the end of the war."

Although it is not known whether Stalin was thinking seriously, he has evaluated the atomic weapons as a means of psychological warfare.

And, along with this view on the power of the atomic weapons, there is the following "conviction," which was born from the evaluation of experiences of the War of the Great Patriotic, on the possibility of a third world war.

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"If the imperialists should start a third world war, there will be no room for doubt that such a war will be the ^{grave yard} ~~grave~~ not only for the individual capitalist countries but for the capitalism of the entire world." (Malenkov, 6 November 1949)

~~since the Soviet Union had already possessed atomic weapons in 1949,
it is believed that (Malenkov, 6 November 1949)~~

Since the Soviet Union had already possessed atomic weapons in 1949, it is believed that Malenkov must have considered that next war will be an atomic war. One gets an impression from Malenkov's statement that next war, even with the appearance of atomic weapons, will not differ much from the last war, and this impression probably comes from the fact that the development of Soviet atomic weapons undoubtedly was not so advanced at the time Malenkov made his statement.

Nevertheless, this statement by Malenkov and Stalin's interpretation have been quoted in earnest by the Soviet Union and Communists throughout the world for a long time.

Then on 12 March 1954, one year after Malenkov had taken over the Premiership after the death of Stalin, the same Malenkov gave a different interpretation in his election speech before the Supreme Soviet.

In that speech, Malenkov declared that a new war waged with the most modern weapons will mean the destruction of the world civilization. Since the USSR already had been in possession of the hydrogen bomb since August 1953, "the modern weapons" was in reference to the hydrogen

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bomb -- in other words, it indicated a thermonuclear weapon and these words negated the official Soviet views on atomic weapons existing up to that time and clarified that the Soviet Union was giving a second look at the power of the hydrogen bomb as a weapon of mass-killing and destruction.

Malenkov's view was also indicated in the Soviet government's note to the US, Great Britain, and France on 31 March 1954. This note, which requested that the Soviet Union be admitted as a member of the NATO, contained the following passage:

"The destructive force of atomic weapons is becoming more and more powerful and, in addition, hydrogen weapons, the power of which is far greater than the power of atomic weapons, have made their appearance. If the atomic and hydrogen weapons are used in the war, they would bring incalculable unhappiness to the peoples, would bring the mass killing of the peaceful population, and would result in the destruction of not only the capitals of the world which are the centers of the old civilization but also of modern industrial cities and centers of culture and science. There will be no doubt about such a destruction."

On the basis of this passage alone, it seems that the Soviet Union was thinking very seriously of the tragic character of the hydrogen bomb and that it was trying to prevent such a war for the sake of humanity. But this attitude changed on 26 April 1954 when Premier Malenkov, in his report to the Supreme Soviet, declared that if the aggressors, relying on atomic weapons, decided to test Soviet strength and capability, the

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aggressors probably will be destroyed by the same weapons. And there was no doubt, Malenkov added, that such an adventure will inevitably result in the destruction of the capitalistic social system.

It can be stated, therefore, that Malenkov's statement was either an effort to correct his election speech of 12 March or to announce that the Soviet Union having gained confidence in the hydrogen weapons, had decided to use such weapons for retaliation.

To assure the "destruction" of the "capitalistic social system" and the survival of the Soviet Union in a hydrogen-bomb war, the Soviet Union must have an effective defense against atomic and hydrogen weapons. Concerning this problem, Pravda, on 17 September 1954, quoting from TASS, reported that "as a result of an experiment on a certain type of atomic weapons, an important result, which will lead to the solution of the problems concerning the defense against an atomic attack, has been achieved."

Does this mean that the Soviet Union has gained confidence in the manufacture of hydrogen weapons and in the defense against such weapons? In a speech before the Supreme Soviet on 8 February 1955, Foreign Minister Molotov boldly declared: "In the production of hydrogen weapons, the Soviet people have succeeded to the extent that it is the US, not the Soviet Union, which is behind." He asserted further, "All risks which accompany in igniting a new world war will inevitably bring about an evil result to the aggressor."

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In that same speech, Molotov explained, "The matter before us is not attacked in a new aggression, it will not be the downfall of the 'world culture' but of the social system which is already decayed to the core and which is standing on the blood-soaked foundation of Imperialism."

It seems that Foreign Minister Molotov's statement contained a political gesture directed at domestic and foreign audiences, but the Minister of Defense Marshal Zhukov's statement, made on 7 February 1955 in his interview with Hearst and Kingsbury-Smith, was more realistic and had good sense.

The pertinent portion of the interview was as follows:

Hearst: "What many people in the United States think that the existence of atomic weapons on both sides will serve as a guarantee of peace because both sides will fear an atomic attack and will decide not to start a war. What do you think?"

Zhukov: "The existence of atomic weapons means that the possibility of their use exists, but does not mean, by ignoring this, can use these weapons... We must not forget that the atomic weapons are swords with double blades. In such a situation, an atomic war is dangerous to the attackers as well as to the attacked."

In short, the Soviet leadership during the developmental stage of atomic and hydrogen weapons, have recognized that there was an extreme danger of atomic war and, at the same time, they have felt such

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a war would not lead to the destruction of "the world civilization" and that even in such a war the Soviet Union would survive.

There was further clarification one year later of the Soviet views when First Deputy Premier Mikoyan spoke at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR on February 1956. Mikoyan stated: "An atomic-hydrogen war will result in a great destruction but it cannot result in the extermination of mankind or its civilization. It will exterminate the obsolete and harmful system -- imperialism."

Kremlin, therefore, has directly opposed the Western interpretation that the hydrogen war will result in a "war of mutual destruction" and that it will result in Communism playing the role of the phoenix or, that, at worse, it will result in the collapse of the "mankind and its civilization." Mikoyan's expression seems to contain two thoughts. One is that the progressive segment of the mankind will unite and rise against the class which plots an atomic war and will put on a "straight-jacket" on the aggressors and "put an end to all forms of war and to capitalism." The other is that the hydrogen war, of course, will be unprofitable for the monopoly capital and that such a war will "result in the destruction and extermination of the monopoly capital." But that, even under the similar condition, Communism will play the role of the "phoenix."

At this point, we would like to ask the Soviet Union, if it truly desires permanent peace, why it cannot state clearly that the hydrogen bomb will "destroy mankind and its civilization"? Moreover, why is it

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that important Soviet officials, when talking about the power of the hydrogen bomb, always explain about its "immense destructive power" but never touch on the "ashes of death". Our doubts increase in direct proportion to the intensification of the USSR's so-called "peace offensive."

C. Experiments on Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons

Approximately two years after Molotov, in November 1947, announced that "in the Soviet Union secrecy over atomic bomb does not exist," the first atomic explosion by the Soviet Union was announced in September 1949 by President Truman.

According to the Pravda publication of 25 September, this first experiment was conducted in July 1949.

Two years later, in September 1951, another experiment on atomic bomb was carried out. The announcement of this experiment was made by Premier Stalin in his interview with a Pravda reporter, the result of which appeared in that paper on 6 October that same year. Still another atomic explosion was confirmed.

For the next two years, not a single atomic explosion in the Soviet Union^{*} was confirmed and no announcements or statements regarding this was made. Consequently, all kinds of rumors were rampant in the various countries, but finally on 8 August 1953 Malenkov cleared up the mystery.

Premier Malenkov declared: "I believe it is necessary to report to the Supreme Soviet that the United States also is not a monopolist

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in the manufacture of the hydrogen bomb." In other words, what Malenkov said was that the Soviet Union had succeeded in producing the hydrogen bomb during those two years.

Malenkov's statement was soon confirmed as a fact. In the 20 August 1953 issue of Pravda, the following passage ^{appeared} under the title of "Report of the Government Concerning the Experiment on the Hydrogen Bomb in the USSR": In the last few days, the Soviet Union has exploded a type of hydrogen bomb for experimental purpose. Since a powerful thermonuclear reaction took place inside the hydrogen bomb, the explosion was powerful. The experiment indicated that the force of the hydrogen bomb was many times greater than that of the atomic bomb."

~~Analysis of the Soviet hydrogen bomb showed that it was a dry bomb~~
(kansei bakudan) which utilised the nuclear fusion reaction of lithium deuteride and that this bomb was cheaper to produce than the US's wet bomb (shissei bakudan) which primarily utilised tritium. Moreover, since it was surmised that the Soviet bomb was capable of being carried in an aircraft, it was thought that the Soviet Union was in a position superior to that of the US, so far as it concerned thermonuclear weapons.

This superiority of the Soviet Union was wiped out when the US conducted its Bikini test in March 1954, thus putting both countries on the same level in the hydrogen bomb race. In August 1954 the Soviet Union again resumed its atomic weapons test, which was announced in Pravda on 17 September 1954.

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At that time, Pravda announced: "In accordance with the plans for scientific research project, a test on a certain type of atomic weapons was conducted in the Soviet Union during the last few days. The purpose of this test was to learn the effects of the atomic bomb explosion. Through this test, the scientists and technicians of the Soviet Union have achieved important results which will contribute greatly to the solution of the problems concerning the defense against an atomic attack."

Also in 1955 the Soviet Union conducted several experimental nuclear explosions. On the night of 23 November, the US Atomic Energy Commission announced that the Soviet Union had conducted its biggest atomic bomb test up to that time. The explosion had a force of several megatons, it was announced. First Secretary of the Party Khrushchev also confirmed this test while he was traveling in India. Pravda, on 27 November, announced the latest test as follows:

"Recently, in accordance with the scientific research and experimental activity plans in the field of atomic energy, experiments on a number of new-type atomic and thermonuclear weapons were conducted in the Soviet Union. The experiments indicated new, important achievements of the Soviet scientists and technicians and, at the same time, proved the accuracy of the various scientific and technical calculations. The explosion of the hydrogen bomb at the end was the most powerful of all the explosions up to this time. The explosion was made at high altitude in order to prevent radiation effects. During this explosion, a broad study was made on the protection of the personnel."

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From the latter part of March and up to the early part of April in 1956, the Soviet Union conducted a nuclear test. According to the 2 April announcement by the US Atomic Energy Commission, the Soviet Union has exploded 60 atomic and thermonuclear bombs, including the latest one.

It can be said, therefore, that the nuclear bomb test race among the US, the USSR, and Great Britain really has begun in earnest.

D. Preparation for the Atomic War

1. Reorganization of Military Science and Tactics

During the World War II years, the military science in the Soviet Union was invariably referred to as the "Stalin Military Science"; this was regarded as the best in the world and was thought to be the basis of all the problems.

But when the possibility of the use of atomic bomb increased and when it has become necessary today to maintain a large quantity of the most complicated equipments, the military theory of the World War II like that of the "Stalin Military Science" became inadequate to cope with the new situation. Now that the Soviet Union is producing its atomic and hydrogen bombs and knows the power of such bombs through tests, the necessity for reorganizing and expanding the "Stalin Military Science" became an urgent one.

Meanwhile, after the death of Stalin, there was increasing tendency among the military leaders to expound their own theory about the military science and tactics.

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An outstanding manifestation of this tendency was Marshal
Kotlyarsky's thesis entitled "For Constructive Research on the
Various Problems of the Soviet Military Science," which was published in
Red Flag on 24 March 1955. Another was a collection of theses entitled
"Marx-Leninism, Army, and Tactical Theories," which the Ministry of
Defense published in March 1955.

In the following, these documents are used as a basis to learn
how the Soviet military science and tactics are being reorganized and
expanded to cope with a modern war using atomic and hydrogen weapons.

As it is well known, Stalin, in studying the military science,
strictly divided into two groups the various factors influencing the
progress and the ending of the war. These two groups were the permanent
and the temporary or contingent factors. In 1942 Stalin stated: "The
fate of the war is not determined by surprise attacks; it is determined
by various factors of a permanent nature, such as the organizational
capability of the commanding officers, equipments of the armed forces,
number and quality of the divisions, esprit de corps of the troops, and
the stability of the home front." This was the so-called "Stalin's
genius concerning the permanent factors determining the fate of war"
which thereafter became a principal maxim at the military school.

But is Stalin's theme still accurate in coping with the new
conditions of an atomic war, and does his theme still hold water in
terms of position, role, and significance?

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First of all, what the writers, including Marshal Rotmistrov, point out in agreement is that the significance and the role of the surprise attack have become very important.

Marshal Rotmistrov states: "Under the circumstances in which the hydrogen bombs are used, a surprise attack in a certain case can become one of the decisive conditions, not only at the outset of the war but also in achieving victories throughout the war."

Colonel A. Pyatkin points out: "Under the circumstances in which powerful atomic weapons are used, a surprise attack, for example, has a very great significance and it is one of the decisive conditions in achieving successes not only in battles and strategies but also in the entire war." Colonel Petrov also apologetically says: "The Soviet military science, although it recognizes that the progress and the ending of the war are determined by the various permanent factors, has never denied the extreme significance of the factor of the surprise attack." He further adds: "At present, accompanied by the increase in the mobility of the Army and by the use of new and powerful types of weapons, the success of surprise attacks of strategic and tactical nature should be extremely significant and it undoubtedly would greatly influence the result of a battle."

The increase in the significance and the role of the element of such a surprise attack will demand from the military and the people a greater increase of security consciousness, a permanent war preparation, and the maintenance of a position to cope with any situation. There is no

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other reason than the recognition of these demands of military science that makes the Soviet authorities repeat in their recent speeches and reports such phrases as the "greater increase of security consciousness" and "constant war preparation."

Nevertheless, as also pointed out by Rotmistrov, "the increase in the role of the element of surprise attack does not diminish at all the role of the various factors which determine the fate of the war and which have permanent effect"; on the contrary, "it increases the role and the significance of these various factors."

For example, let us take up the factor called the stability of the home front. This factor, in the final analysis, has the indivisible relationship with the role of the people in war, and under the various conditions of a modern war this factor becomes decisive in the following possible situations:

The first situation, as stated in the thesis of Colonel Petrov, is the fact that the "modern war is a war of huge armies." The second situation is that in the event of a war employing mass-killing-and-wounding weapons, the "sacrifice and devastation caused by such a war will be very great and they will demand from the peoples greater strain, both physically ^{and} spiritually, and moral endurance far greater than that experienced during World War II. The third situation is the fact that "the role of the home front in a modern war has greatly increased."

Therefore, one can conclude that in an atomic war "the role of the people will become much greater than in any previous wars." It

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is clear, as regarded in the Soviet military science, that more than ever the factor of the stability of the home front will have a great significance and a great role.

It is also regarded in the Soviet military science that the spiritual and political factor as manifested in the "esprit de corps of the troops" will have a strong effect in a possible atomic war. Concerning this factor, Engineer Major General G. Pekrovskiy pointed out the importance of this factor in an atomic war.

Regarding other factors, since there is no change in the fact that "the primary strength in an armed conflict is men" even in an atomic war, the Soviet military science stresses the theory that "the victory in the final analysis depends on the number and quality of the troops, organisational ability of the commanding officer and esprit de corps and unity of the troops, provided that other conditions (such as the material and technical foundations, strategic resources, and fighting techniques) are equal." (Colonel Sokolov).

On the role of the "space" in a war, Marshal Betinistrov hopes that it will be a "superior point" for the Soviet Union in an atomic war.

In view of the foregoing, the Soviet military science, while recognizing the increase in the significance and the role of the element of the surprise attack, does not deny the significance and the role of the various permanent factors and, on the contrary, it acknowledges that the various permanent factors would even be expanded.

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Next, what are the changes that have been made in military techniques (strategy, operational technique, and tactics), which is one of the branches of military science?

Concerning the role of the atomic and hydrogen weapons in military technique, Engineer Major General Pokrovskiy states as follows:

"The atomic and hydrogen weapons, in their present stage of development, merely supplement the fighting power of the old weapons. Various weapons such as artillery, firearms, tanks, and aircraft have been the basic fire power of the armed forces, and this is so even today..... Under such conditions, the new weapons can become the most important factor in determining the result of the war by combining such weapons with old ones."

Based on such a concept, Pokrovskiy anticipates the role and the demands for the various types of weapons and equipments in an atomic war as follows:

"Under the various conditions in which the atomic weapons are used, consideration must be given to the fact that targets will have greater mobility and dispersion. The task of the artillery and air force probably will be the annihilation of a number of moving targets.....Furthermore, as defense measures against an atomic attack, it will be necessary to construct a number of underground or semi-underground shelters and evacuation centers and it will also be necessary to develop means to destroy such installations. In this connection, the role of the reconnaissance against a well-camouflaged moving targets will really

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increase and the role of the modern method of discovering and destroying the enemy's atomic weapons particularly ^{will} increase.Under all conditions, there will be an increased demands upon transport planes which can assure rapid mobility of the Army and there will be an increase in the essential value of helicopters and fighter planes which can take to the air without using an airfield. The land transportation system must be improved considerably, particularly the ability to cross rivers. Since it is necessary to ensure large-scale construction work, road building, and building fortification, demands will be made to improve special and universal digging machinery and to extend the mechanization of engineering work. Greater development must also be made in the means for ensuring battle movements at night and in fog."

These are mainly elaboration of various demands on technique, but Pokrovskiy, as a conclusion, provides the following policy concerning the research in military sciences:

"It is important for the military commentators, in giving an insight into the distant future, to indicate clearly the military outlook in connection with the development of nuclear science. They must study very carefully the various fields of science, distinguish those which can play a role in the military, and, with this as the basis, determine how a future war would be different from past wars. In doing this, it is also necessary to distinguish what is most important and basic from among the many new factors and, at the same time, to consider not only the analysis of the problems of atomic weapons but also the future role of naval technique and aircraft, particularly the role of atomic

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energy in unmanned, ^{long-}range aircraft, and the possibility of the use of atomic power generating stations in naval bases and fortified places."

In summarizing the reorganization of military science and techniques, Defense Minister Zhukov declared at the 20th Party Congress as follows:

"The postwar Soviet military science, based on the universalization of the experiences of the war and the subsequent technical developments, has provided the right direction in the construction and training of our armed strength.

"By considering the greater progress of science and technique and the appearance of new mass-killing methods and weapons, we must further decide on the form and method best suited for an armed struggle, study them very thoroughly, and introduce them to the training of our Army."

Marshal Zhukov then described the role of the weapons including atomic bombs and the status and role of the men in war as follows:

"In our thinking, weapons, themselves, cannot determine the fate of battles or operations, even if they are of maximum effectiveness, and they cannot win. Even in future wars the results of an armed conflict are determined by men who are willing to defend the interest of their nation, who have deep confidence in their government, who have conviction in the justness of the war aim, and who make effective use of war material."

2. Strengthening of the Defense Position

As evident in the foregoing, it is natural that the present Soviet military science is being pushed not only in the military

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~~science, is being pushed not only in the military preparation for atomic war but also in all economic, political, and sociological fields, as long as the Soviet military science is based on the idea that the permanent factors, including the field of atomic and hydrogen bombs, must be superior in position to that of the enemy's.~~

For example, the factor of national defense played an important part in the determination of a 65-percent increase in the rate of the Soviet Union's industrial production for the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-60). The breakdown of this increase gives the increased production rate for producer's goods at approximately 70 percent and the rate for consumer's goods at approximately 60 percent, as usual implementing the industry-first policy, especially heavy industry. Another example is that this Five-Year Plan gives emphasis to the development of natural resources in Eastern Europe and to the stepping up, to a greater degree than those in the Soviet Union as a whole, the tempo of basic construction in Eastern and Western Siberia and Kazakhstan, particularly to the establishment of a metallurgical base and the development of power resources in Siberia.

The eastward movement of the Soviet industrial productive power -- that is, movement to the arctic zone in the country -- and the advance since last year of the Soviet Union into Middle and Near East and Southeast Asia can be regarded as natural, from the point of view of defense in a hydrogen-bomb era.

From the same point of view, it is also proper to look upon the increase in the military construction throughout the Soviet Union,

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particularly in the eastern and northern parts, and the progress made in the surveying and developing of the northern country, particularly in the Arctic region, since 1944, as a part of the move to strengthen the defense position.

Steady progress also is being made in the military preparation for an atomic war. This is elucidated in the rest of this report.

The reconstruction of the Soviet Army in preparation for an atomic war, started after the end of World War II, particularly after the possession of atomic bombs by the Soviet Union, has been pushed from the following point of view:

"In constructing the Soviet Army, we are basing it on the standpoint that that our method of future wars will be different in many respects from past wars. A future war, if it is indeed, will be characterized by the massive employment of air power, different types of rocket weapons, and different types of mass-killing weapons -- atomic, chemical, and gas weapons. However, we base our position on the ground that the most modern weapons, including the mass-killing weapons, will not lessen the final significance of the army, navy, and air forces." (Zakharov)

The first manifestation of this viewpoint is that a greater emphasis was given to the air force and air defense unit in the organization of the military strength. Moreover, in strengthening the air force, constant and rapid improvement of large-type bombers and fighter planes is being carried out. For example, on May Day 1954 only



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one 4-jet large-type plane appeared but on May Day 1955 two of them appeared. Beginning with MiG-17, which replaced MiG-15, the production of other planes such as the light fighters and medium-type jet bombers is being rapidly carried out. While the encouragement of and the development of gliders and balloons for civil aviation are being pushed, it is fair to say that the military use of these planes is being rapidly prepared. Also regarding the strengthening of the air defense units, the increased use of anti-aircraft guns appearing in the May Day and Revolution Anniversary parades and the establishment of air defense districts are indications of the efforts being made in this direction.

The second manifestation is that the Soviet Union is now in possession of all types of rocket and jet weapons, not to mention atomic and hydrogen weapons. This is clearly evident in recent speeches of the Soviet leaders. The first reference to the power of the rocket weapons by the Soviet authorities was made in November 1949 when the Soviet authorities, in their reply to President Eisenhower's proposal on the formation of the international pool of atomic energy, mentioned "the power of atomic torpedoes and rocket weapons with a range of several thousand kilometers," aroused the interest of the US government. By its memorandum to the US, British, and French governments in July 1954, the Soviet government again made reference to the long-range rocket weapons. Now, nearly two years later, the development of these weapons have reached a point where Defense Minister Malin reported to the 20th Party Congress "Soviet Army now has all types of rocket weapons, including the long-range rockets," and Premier Malin reported to the 20th Party Congress during his

speech during his visit to Great Britain, declared, "In the near future, the Soviet Union probably will be in possession of guided missiles with hydrogen-bomb warheads that can be dropped anywhere."

The possession and the development of atomic and hydrogen weapons and the jet planes and long-range rocket weapons by the Soviet Union have made important Soviet officials to make various statements as follows:

"We have a reliable means to transport hydrogen bombs to any spot on earth." (Sokolovskiy, 23 February 1956)

"Atomic and hydrogen bombs also have made their appearance in the Soviet Union and the means to transport them to any spot on earth by plane or rocket have made their appearance." (Chuykov, 16 February 1956)

"The Soviet Union has surpassed America [in the development of] hydrogen weapons and the means to transport them." (Marshal Chuykov, 22 January 1956)

The third manifestation is that the modernization of the ground units has made considerable progress. The modernization of the Army -- in other words, the mechanization and motorization of the ground units and the increasing of firepower and improvement of tanks, all aimed at coping with a hypothetical atomic war, have been carried out in the postwar years with vigor, particularly during the Fifth Five-Year Plan, and the results of these efforts have been considerable as evidenced by several developments. The fact that a large weapon that looked like an atomic gun appeared in

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the May Day parade of 1955, that the main strength of the tank divisions has been practically converted from T-34 to the new T-54 tanks, and that the infantry has been equipped with a large number of armored and transport vehicles.

Concerning this modernization of armed forces, Zhukov states: "The rifle divisions are equipped with a more effective weapons and have been completely motorized. Such divisions are equipped with highly effective tanks and self-propelled artillery. The mechanized divisions and tank divisions are superior in combat mobility and capability of operating independently than those in the last war. As to the artillery, we have achieved great results in improving the artillery qualitatively."

In other words, the Soviet Army has completed its qualitative improvement as a ground force capable of fighting in an atomic war which has great mobility, particularly maneuverability in rough terrain, for concentration and dispersion.

The fourth manifestation is that the Navy has been strengthened. In building up its Navy, the Soviet Union stands on the viewpoint that "the struggles in the sea in the future war will be of incalculable significance, compared with those in the last war" (Zhukov) and has strenuously built up its naval strength. In 1954 the Soviet Navy surpassed British Navy in terms of the number of ships, becoming second largest in the world. The Soviet Navy is organized for the main purpose of carrying out joint operations with the Army and is being trained for this purpose.

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The fifth manifestation is the intensification of education and training of land, sea, and air forces to cope with a hypothetical atomic war. On this matter, it has been reported that "In the last few years, the land, air, and naval forces have been devoting great efforts for the purpose of training the units the techniques of battle operations to cope with the various conditions in which atomic weapons and other new war devices are used." (Zhukov) And on the results of this training, the various units have acquired "practical experience necessary for carrying out the battle tasks under the most complicated conditions on land, sea, and air." (Zhukov) Moreover, attention should be given to the fact that since 1954, particularly after 1955, the information concerning atomic weapons, hydrogen weapons, atomic energy and protection from atomic radiation, and guided missiles has been introduced via announcements to the general officers and men through Red Star, the Soviet Army organ, Defense Ministry publications, and other independent publications. Attention also should be given to the fact that since the last few years, accompanied by the improvement in the general education, particularly the standard of technical education, the degree of proficiency in military training among new recruits has improved.

The sixth manifestation is the improvement of paramilitary education. Concerning the activities of SOBMF, which was reorganized in 1952, the improvement in the organization's activities has been noted since the last two years and Defense Minister Zhukov also has emphasized this in his report to the 20th Party Congress. This demand for improvement is based on

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the necessity to provide military education to young men who will not be entering the Army because of the reduction in the armed strength and on the necessity to plan for the strengthening of the civilian defense.

Through various means, every effort is being given to improve civilian aviation sports, especially the technical improvement of gliders and parachuting. Similar effort is being made to disseminate scientific and technical knowledge, including the use of atomic energy. The latest trend in emphasizing the spiritual factor in the national education cannot be overlooked, either.

As in the above manifestations, the Soviet Union, on the one hand, advocates the lessening of the international tension expounding the so-called peace policy and advocating the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and, on the other hand, the Soviet Union plans for the top priority development of heavy industry and earnestly prepares for war.

The Soviet Union represents its war preparation, including [the production of] atomic and hydrogen weapons, as a "defense power" and as a "retaliatory power"; Khrushchev also states, "The Soviet Union possibly will not use nuclear weapons first." But this position also is the same for Western Europe. Moreover, the Soviet Union stresses that it has responded to the demands for peace by "deeds," not words, in reducing the armed strength by 640,000 and withdrawing from Port Arthur and Porkkala, but these actions have been taken in line with the general trend of war preparation in an atomic- and hydrogen-bomb era and it is unthinkable

 **SECRET** 

25X1

that they will influence the power relationship between the US and the Soviet Union.

To the Soviet Union, both the consolidation of peace and the preparation for war are carried out merely "in the interest of the Soviet State." Therefore, the fact that the Soviet Union is strengthening its war preparedness while strongly pushing the peace policy is not a contradiction.

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